# Intoduction to the Fifth Workshop Game-Theoretic Probability and Related Topics

Glenn Shafer 13 November 2014

- 1. Basics of game-theoretic probability
- 2. Probability-free finance
- 3. Prediction

### Conventional wisdom

Maybe you have the wrong model.

Rare event more likely than you think. (Taleb)

Good prediction means getting the model right.

### Game-theoretic alternative

Often no correct model. Only a game.

Many events have no probability at all. (Kolmogorov)

Prediction is a game that can be played well.

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### Pascal instead of Fermat

- Rules for betting instead of stochastic model.
- Expectation = cost of replication

### Game-theoretic testing

- Proof that E happens with high probability
  = strategy for getting very rich if E does not happen
- Proof that E happens for sure
  - = strategy for getting infinitely rich if *E* does not happen

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# Pascal saw a game.

## Pascal's question



Pascal's answer Paul can replicate his payoff starting with 16.



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### Rules of the game

Even odds.<br/>Paul gets 64 if he wins twice.Expectation<br/>= cost of replicationIf the game ends now, how much<br/>should Paul get?Expectation = 16<br/>Probability of winning =  $\frac{16}{54} = \frac{1}{4}$ 

# Fermat saw a stochastic model.

# Fermat's model

Suppose they play two rounds!



# Four equally possible outcomes

- 1. Peter wins, Peter wins.
- 2. Peter wins, Paul wins.
- 3. Paul wins, Peter wins.
- 4. Paul wins, Paul wins.

### Fermat's answer

Paul gets 64 only in outcome 4. So Paul should get 16.



### Pierre Fermat, 1601-1665

### Pascal instead of Fermat

- Rules for betting instead of stochastic model.
- Expectation = cost of replication

## Game-theoretic testing

- Proof that *E* happens with high probability
  = strategy for getting very rich if *E* fails
- Proof that E happens for sure
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# Example of a probability game

Three players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality

### On each round...

Forecaster announces the price *m* for a payoff *x*.

Skeptic buys *M* units of *x*.

Reality announces the value of *x*.

Skeptic receives the net gain M(x - m).

Perfect information: Players see and remember each other's moves.

### Roles

Forecaster is the model.

Skeptic buys *M* units of *x*.

Skeptic tests the prices offered by Forecaster.

# $\mathcal{K}_n =$ Skeptic's capital

$$\mathcal{K}_0 := 1.$$
  
FOR  $n = 1, 2, ..., N$ :  
Forecaster announces  $m_n \in [-1, 1]$ .  
Skeptic announces  $M_n \in \mathbb{R}$ .  
Reality announces  $x_n \in [-1, 1]$ .  
 $\mathcal{K}_n := \mathcal{K}_{n-1} + M_n(x_n - m_n)$ .

# An event with high probability

$$\begin{split} \mathcal{K}_0 &:= 1. \\ \text{FOR } n = 1, 2, \dots, N: \\ \text{Forecaster announces } m_n \in [-1, 1]. \\ \text{Skeptic announces } M_n \in \mathbb{R}. \\ \text{Reality announces } x_n \in [-1, 1]. \\ \mathcal{K}_n &:= \mathcal{K}_{n-1} + M_n(x_n - m_n). \end{split}$$

### Game-theoretic testing

Proof that *E* happens with high probability = strategy for getting very rich if *E* fails

Example where *E* is the event  $\left|\frac{1}{N}\sum_{n=1}^{N}(x_n - m_n)\right| < \epsilon$ 

### Proposition

Skeptic has a strategy that turns his initial capital of 1 into  $\frac{1}{2} \exp \epsilon^2 N/2$ if the event  $|\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} (x_n - m_n)| < \epsilon$  fails.

# GET VERY RICH means GREATLY MULTIPLY THE CAPITAL YOU RISK

### Game-theoretic testing

Proof that E happens with high probability

= strategy for greatly multiplying the capital risked if E fails

### Proposition

Skeptic has a strategy that does not risk bankruptcy and turns his initial capital of 1 into  $\frac{1}{2} \exp \epsilon^2 N/2$  if  $|\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} (x_n - m_n)| < \epsilon$  if fails.

#### A strategy that risks bankruptcy does not qualify as a proof.

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 $\mathcal{K}_0 := 1.$ FOR n = 1, 2, ...: Forecaster announces  $m_n \in [-1, 1]$ . Skeptic announces  $M_n \in \mathbb{R}$ . Reality announces  $x_n \in [-1, 1]$ .  $\mathcal{K}_n := \mathcal{K}_{n-1} + M_n(x_n - m_n).$ 

### Game-theoretic testing

Proof that *E* happens for sure = strategy for getting infinitely rich if *E* fails

## Proposition

Skeptic has a strategy that does not risk bankruptcy and turns his initial capital of 1 into  $\infty$  if  $\frac{1}{N}\sum_{n=1}^{N}(x_n - m_n) \rightarrow \infty$  does not happen.

## We just learned...

**Pure probability:** Prove theorems about what happens with high probability or for sure by constructing strategies for Skeptic.

**Statistical testing:** Forecaster is the model. Use Skeptic's strategies to test the model.

### Now let's talk about...

**Probability-free finance:** The hypothesis that Skeptic will not become rich without risking bankruptcy becomes a form of the efficient-market hypothesis.

**Prediction:** Construct strategies for Forecaster that will pass the most important tests.

# GAME-THEORETIC EFFICIENT-MARKET HYPOTHESIS: A speculator will not greatly multiply the capital he risks.

#### Some consequences

- 1 Volatility of prices proportional to  $\sqrt{dt}$
- 2 Ito calculus in the limit with more and more frequent trading
- 3 CAPM
- 4 Equity premium close to squared volatility of index

# One way of achieving good prediction without a stochastic model

Construct strategy for Forecaster that passes the most important tests.

- Formulate each test with as a strategy for Skeptic.
- Average the strategies for Skeptic.
- Forecaster pays against the average.