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Question

# Does God Play Dice in Game Theoretic Probability?

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GTP, Guanajuato, 14/11/14

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## Outline

**Matching Pennies** 

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# Outline

## **Matching Pennies**

Game

No Wealth by Matching Pennies

Wealth by Matching Pennies

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# Bimatrix presentation of 2-player games

• 
$$A_1 = \{U, D\}$$

• 
$$A_2 = \{L, R\}$$

• 
$$u = \langle u_1, u_2 \rangle : A_1 \times A_2 \to \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}$$

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc} L & R \\ & u_2(U,L) & u_2(U,R) \\ \\ U & u_1(U,L) & u_1(U,R) \\ & u_2(D,L) & u_2(D,R) \\ \\ D & u_1(D,L) & u_1(D,R) \end{array}$$

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## ▶ players: A, B

• moves:  $M_A = M_B = \{H, T\}$ 

• 
$$u = \langle u_A, u_B \rangle : M_A \times M_B \to \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}$$



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## Strategy: Randomize!

The only Nash equilibrium for Matching Pennies is the profile  $\langle a, b \rangle$  where the players randomize

$$p(a = H) = \frac{1}{2} = p(b = H)$$

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## Randomness: Strategy!

The other way around, we can define that a sequence

### $H, T, T, H, T \dots$

is random iff it is a strategy for Matching Pennies that does not lose against any opponent.

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## Randomness: Strategy!

The other way around, we can define that a sequence

$$H, T, T, H, T \dots$$

is random iff it is a strategy for Matching Pennies that does not lose against any opponent.

[**Reason**: If you can write a short program to predict the next move with probability  $> \frac{1}{2}$ , then you can win Matching Pennies.]

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## Suspicion

Is this a bit like Game Theoretic Probability?

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## Suspicion

- Is this a bit like Game Theoretic Probability?
- Maybe not quite...

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## Matching Pennies against Nature

• moves:  $M_A = M_B = \{+, -\}, M_N = \{00, 01, 10, 11\}$ 

• 
$$u = \langle u_{A,B}, u_N \rangle : M_{A,B} \times M_N \to \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}$$



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# Matching Pennies against Nature

## Game protocol

- *N* moves first with  $xy \in \{0, 1\}^2$
- A sees x (not y or b) and responds with  $a \in \{+, -\}$
- ▶ *B* sees *y* (not *x* or *a*) and responds with  $b \in \{+, -\}$

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# Matching Pennies against Nature

## Game protocol

- *N* moves first with  $xy \in \{0, 1\}^2$
- A sees x (not y or b) and responds with  $a \in \{+, -\}$
- ▶ *B* sees *y* (not *x* or *a*) and responds with  $b \in \{+, -\}$

## Remark

They play a game of imperfect information.

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# Coordinating pennies: Strategies

- N's moves xy are random and uniformly distributed.
- A and B should coordinate to specify
  - A's strategy: probability distribution p(a|x)
  - B's strategy: probability distribution p(b|y)

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to maximize their payoffs.

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# Coordinating pennies: Payoffs

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$$\mathbb{U}_{AB} = \frac{1}{4} \Big( \mathbb{E}_{AB}(00) + \mathbb{E}_{AB}(01) + \mathbb{E}_{AB}(10) - \mathbb{E}_{AB}(11) \Big)$$
$$\mathbb{E}_{AB}(xy) = \sum_{a,b \in M_{AB}} a \cdot b \cdot p(ab | xy)$$

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where we muliply  $a, b \in \{+, -\}$  as if they are +1 and -1

## Theorem

If the mutual dependency of *x* and *y* is expressed by a variable  $\lambda \in \Lambda$  with density  $q : \Lambda \rightarrow [0, 1]$ , so that

$$p(ab|xy) = \int_{\Lambda} p(a|x,\lambda) \cdot p(b|y,\lambda) \cdot q(\lambda) d\lambda \quad (1)$$

then

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB} \leq \frac{1}{2} \tag{2}$$

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## Proof

## Write

$$\mathbb{E}_{A}(x,\lambda) = \sum_{a \in M_{A}} a \cdot p(a | x, \lambda)$$
$$\mathbb{E}_{B}(y,\lambda) = \sum_{b \in M_{B}} b \cdot p(b | y, \lambda)$$
$$\mathbb{E}_{AB}(xy,\lambda) = \mathbb{E}_{A}(x,\lambda) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{B}(y,\lambda)$$

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## Proof

Then

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB} = \int_{\Lambda} \mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) \cdot q(\lambda) d\lambda$$

for

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) = \frac{1}{4} \Big( \mathbb{E}_{A}(0,\lambda) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_{A}(0,\lambda) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{B}(1,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_{A}(1,\lambda) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_{A}(1,\lambda) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{B}(1,\lambda) \Big)$$

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## Proof

Then

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB} = \int_{\Lambda} \mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) \cdot q(\lambda) d\lambda$$

for

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) &= \frac{1}{4} \Big( \mathbb{E}_{A}(0,\lambda) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_{A}(0,\lambda) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{B}(1,\lambda) + \\ & \mathbb{E}_{A}(1,\lambda) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_{A}(1,\lambda) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{B}(1,\lambda) \Big) \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \Big( \mathbb{E}_{A}(0,\lambda) \cdot \big( \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_{B}(1,\lambda) \big) + \\ & \mathbb{E}_{A}(1,\lambda) \cdot \big( \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_{B}(1,\lambda) \big) \Big) \end{split}$$

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### Proof

Since  $-1 \leq \mathbb{E}_A(0, \lambda), \mathbb{E}_A(1, \lambda) \leq 1$ 

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) \hspace{.1in} \leq \hspace{.1in} rac{1}{4} \Bigl( ig| \mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) ig| + ig| \mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) ig| \Bigr)$$

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## Proof

Since 
$$-1 \leq \mathbb{E}_{A}(0, \lambda), \mathbb{E}_{A}(1, \lambda) \leq 1$$

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) \leq rac{1}{4} \Big( \big| \mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) \big| + \big| \mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) \big| \Big)$$

If  $\mathbb{E}_{B}(0, \lambda) \geq \max\{0, \mathbb{E}_{B}(1, \lambda)\}$ , then it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) &\leq \frac{1}{4} \Big( \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_{B}(1,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_{B}(1,\lambda) \Big) \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \Big( \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_{B}(0,\lambda) \Big) \\ &\leq \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

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since  $0 \leq \mathbb{E}_B(0, \lambda) \leq 1$ .

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### Proof

Since 
$$-1 \leq \mathbb{E}_{A}(0, \lambda), \mathbb{E}_{A}(1, \lambda) \leq 1$$

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) \leq \frac{1}{4} \Big( \big| \mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) \big| + \big| \mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) \big| \Big)$$

If  $0 \ge \mathbb{E}_B(0, \lambda) \ge \mathbb{E}_B(1, \lambda)$ , then it follows that

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) &\leq \frac{1}{4} \Big( -\mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) \Big) \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \Big( -\mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) \Big) \\ &\leq \frac{1}{2} \end{split}$$

since  $0 \geq \mathbb{E}_B(1, \lambda) \geq -1$ .

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### Proof

Since 
$$-1 \leq \mathbb{E}_{A}(0, \lambda), \mathbb{E}_{A}(1, \lambda) \leq 1$$

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) \leq rac{1}{4} \Big( ig| \mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) + \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) ig| + ig| \mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) - \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda) ig| \Big)$$

If  $\mathbb{E}_B(0,\lambda) \leq \mathbb{E}_B(1,\lambda),$  then the two analogous cases again give

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) \leq \frac{1}{2}$$

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## Proof

In all cases

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB} = \int_{\Lambda} \mathbb{U}_{AB}(\lambda) \cdot q(\lambda) d\lambda \leq \int_{\Lambda} \frac{1}{2} q(\lambda) d\lambda = \frac{1}{2}$$

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### Interpretation

Suppose that

- ► A, B and N repeat the game infinitely often, and
- A and B invest  $\frac{1}{2}$  each for every bet.

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## Interpretation

Suppose that

- A, B and N repeat the game infinitely often, and
- A and B invest  $\frac{1}{2}$  each for every bet.

Since *N*'s moves are uniformly distributed, *A* and *B*'s chances are

- $\frac{3}{4}$  to win \$1
- <sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub> to lose \$1

i.e. the expected winnings for each of them are

$$\frac{3}{4}(\$1) + \frac{1}{4}(-\$1) = \$\frac{1}{2}$$

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### Interpretation

So if A and B randomize their moves uniformly, in the long run their wealth remains unchanged. GPD GTP?

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## Interpretation

- So if A and B randomize their moves uniformly, in the long run their wealth remains unchanged.
  - This is the Nash equilibrium of Matching Pennies.

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## Interpretation

- So if A and B randomize their moves uniformly, in the long run their wealth remains unchanged.
  - This is the Nash equilibrium of Matching Pennies.
- The question is whether they can increase their wealth by coordinating.
  - The answer suggested by the Theorem is NO.

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## Another suspicion

- Is averaging out the hidden variable *λ* really the only way in which *A* and *B* can coordinate?
- Maybe not?

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Idea

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E.g., they could also use entangled photons

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## Idea

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Question

Plants extract their strategic advantage similarly: photosynthesis is a quantum effect!

## Claim

Using a physical device, *A* and *B* can disprove the Hidden Variable Theorem.

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## Claim

Using a physical device, *A* and *B* can disprove the Hidden Variable Theorem.

## More precisely

Measuring entangled photons, A and B can coordinate their strategies to match pennies against N in such a way that their wealth will increase, infinitely in the long run.

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## A and B's strategic device



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## A and B's preparation

• The device emits  $\vec{x}$  and  $\vec{y}$  in the singlet state

$$\Psi = \frac{|\downarrow\uparrow\rangle - |\uparrow\downarrow\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \frac{|\rightarrow\leftarrow\rangle - |\leftarrow\rightarrow\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$$

• A measures the spin of  $\vec{x}$  in the basis

$$\left\{ \left|\downarrow\right\rangle ,\qquad\left|\uparrow\right\rangle \right\}$$

• B measures the spin of  $\vec{y}$  in the basis

$$\Big\{|\rightarrow\rangle = \frac{-(|\downarrow\rangle + |\uparrow\rangle)}{\sqrt{2}}, \qquad |\leftarrow\rangle = \frac{-(|\downarrow\rangle - |\uparrow\rangle)}{\sqrt{2}}\Big\}$$

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## A and B's strategy

The response to *N*'s move  $xy \in \{00, 01, 10, 11\}$  is:

- A sees x ∈ {0, 1}
- if x = 0 measure  $|\downarrow\rangle$
- if x = 1 measure  $|\uparrow\rangle$
- ▶ if yes then play a = +
- ▶ otherwise play a = −

- *B* sees  $y \in \{0, 1\}$
- if y = 0 measure  $| \rightarrow \rangle$
- if y = 1 measure  $|\leftarrow\rangle$
- ▶ if yes then play b = +

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▶ otherwise play b = -

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Expected payoff for A and B

Since  $\mathbb{E}_{AB}(xy) = -\vec{x} \cdot \vec{y}$ , it follows that

$$\mathbb{E}_{AB}(00) = \mathbb{E}_{AB}(01) = \mathbb{E}_{AB}(10) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$$
  
 $\mathbb{E}_{AB}(11) = -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$ 

which gives

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB} = \frac{1}{4} \Big( \mathbb{E}_{AB}(00) + \mathbb{E}_{AB}(01) + \mathbb{E}_{AB}(10) - \mathbb{E}_{AB}(11) \Big)$$
$$= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$$

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Expected payoff for A and B

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 $\mathbb{E}_{AB}(11) = -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$ 

which gives

$$\mathbb{U}_{AB} = \frac{1}{4} \Big( \mathbb{E}_{AB}(00) + \mathbb{E}_{AB}(01) + \mathbb{E}_{AB}(10) - \mathbb{E}_{AB}(11) \Big)$$
  
=  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} > \frac{1}{2}$ 

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A and B can coordinate to win, but they coordined strategy is not realized through a hidden variable, i.e.

$$p(ab|xy) \neq \int_{\Lambda} p(a|x) \cdot p(b|y) \cdot q(\lambda) d\lambda$$

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## Background

- A and B's strategy is based on the Einstein-Podelsky-Rosen's setup (EPR) for "spooky action at distance"
  - Einstein's conclusion: since action at distance is impossible, there must be a hidden variable
- The Hidden Variable Theorem is based on John Bell's inequality.
  - Quantum theoretic prediction: Bell's Inequality can be violated

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## Background

- A and B's strategy is based on the Einstein-Podelsky-Rosen's setup (EPR) for "spooky action at distance"
  - Einstein's conclusion: since action at distance is impossible, there must be a hidden variable
- The Hidden Variable Theorem is based on John Bell's inequality.
  - Quantum theoretic prediction: Bell's Inequality can be violated <u>we experimentally confirmed</u>

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# Game Theoretic Probability

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# What does this have to do with Game Theoretic Probability?

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Philosophy of Probability

Question

Whence probability?

### Answers

subjective: Because we average over hidden variables

- Bernoulli, Laplace, Einstein, 't Hooft
- objective: Because God plays dice
  - Darwin, Bachelier, Born, Zurek

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# Game Theoretic Probability

Strategy

Formulate a Probability Theory such that it

- arises from the strategies in a forecasting game
- provides a unified account of random processes
  - supports subjective and objective interpretation

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Physics of Probability

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### But the interpretations can be tested experimentally!

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Physics of Probability

Question

Does God play dice?

Answers

- no: The world is deterministic
  - Einstein, Bohm, superstrings...
- yes: The world emerges from randomness
  - Bell, Aspect, quantum darwinism...

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Pennies

Question

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# Game Theoretic Probability

#### GPD GTP?

Dusko Pavlovic

Pennies

Question

## Question

Can we

- provide a unified account of random processes
- that allows (thought) experimental testing?